Driving Force of Regionalism Essay

To what extent and in what ways have the driving perpetrates of percentagealism in second-east Asia changed since the end of the polar War?regionalism has become a trend in many regions of the universe of discourse. Among them, Europe, mating America and Asia (Asia Pacific region) are crucial ones. Some observers cope that the world bless have been divided amongst these three regions with the existence of the European Union (EU), the North Ameri mountain Free trade Agreement (NFTA) and The Association of south-east Asiatic Nations (ASEAN). This divergent part of the world requires comprehensive realization to make sense of how they have developed throughout muniment. In particular, writing the history of Southeast Asia remains a argufy as it involves the understanding of societies that often took quite different spate of the past (and) a region where the implications of that historical tradition may have a political consequence1. Clapham nones that it is up to now more(prenominal) challenging to analyse foreign policy making in Southeast Asia region2. The proterozoic 1970s was a signifi freightert period for the states in this region as it was during this time that five countries decided to join together and define their position in the polar War between two mights and claimed their neutrality.The detail that ASEAN has come up with much(prenominal) a policy is interesting to look at as it gives not lonesome(prenominal) an insight of the driving take outs of regionalism in Southeast Asia but also how these developing states saw themselves and invent their foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. This paper aims to analyse ASEANs behaviour in order to access to what extent regionalism has changed since the end of Cold War in Southeast Asia. In that, regionalism would be conceived as a state-led or states-led project designed to reorganize a particular regional space along defined scotch and political lines3. The password is div ided into four parts.The first part discusses the useful abstractive insights of shelter club to explain why ASEAN states encourage in the midst of hot shelter challenge in the region. The second part identifies the prudence of ASEAN during the post-Cold War period. Given the confine of this paper, the discussion specifically examines the guinea pig of the Spratly Islands and the creation of ARF. In the concluding section, achievements and prospects for ASEAN will be addressed. The central argument that this paper advance is that regionalism in Southeast Asia has changed and the changes have beendriven and constrained by the bail condition during the post-Cold War era where a regional power vacuum is found.ASEAN emerged from the Cold War as a regional organization in 1967. With the accession of Cambodia, it seemed to be fulfilling the aspirations of its founding fathers to expand membership to admit all ten Southeast Asian countries. However, with the end of Cold War and t he settlement of Cambodian conflict, ASEAN is facing a bare-ass challenge cerebrate to issues of security and stability in the post-Cold War regional environment4. check to the Bangkok Declaration of 1967, the goal of ASEAN is to belt along the economic growth, social put across and cultural development in the region to safeguard the political and economic stability of the region against big power rivalry and to serve as a fabrication for the closure of intra-regional differences5. The formation of ASEAN should be seen as a sum of maintaining peace and stability by providing a forum for the discussion and resolution of regional issues relating to security.There are and then a bend of incidents to show that security issue is the major(ip) concern of ASEAN much(prenominal) as the call for a Zone of Peace, Freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN), the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and ASEANs role in the Cambodian conflict in the 1980s. However, with the end of Cold War, ASEA N faced a new challenge to its goal when the security environment of South-east Asia was transformed by the change from the old bipolar Cold War security system to the new emerging multipolar system. The new power pattern in the region forced the ASEAN states to cooperate as they realized the security could be in danger if they do not collaborate to improve the situation. This kind of behaviour of the ASEAN states can be best explained by Deutschs discussion of security communities. This was especially evident in the correction of regional integration and some scholars argued that the image of security connection provides the most useful framework to analyze ASEAN regionalism. According to Deutsch, a security community is a mathematical group that has become integrated and accompanied by stiff or informal institutions or practices in order to assure smooth change among members of a group over a long period of time6.Essentially, members within the community retain their indepen dence and sovereignty. The two attributes of such a community are marked by the absence of war and make violence. To be more specific, asYalem notes, a regional security community is a group of states which have renounced the use of force as a means of resolving intra-regional conflicts7. Deutsch further adds that there should be no contingency grooming or war-oriented resource mobilization against some other members within a security community. This could be acted as an index number of whether states have developed dependable expectations of peaceful change8. Furthermore, whether a security community has been achieved can in truth be tested operationally in terms of the absence or presence of significant organized preparations for was or larger-scale violence among its members9. When applying the conception of security communities into the study of regionalism, it is important to make a distinction between security community and a security regime. Buzan defines security regime as a group of states cooperate to manage their differences and avoid war by seeking to mute the security dilemma both by their own actions and by their assumptions about the behaviour of others10.Although this seems similar to the concept of security community, there is a major difference in that a security regime refers to a situation where the interests of the actors are both not wholly compatible and competitive. Thus, the resulting relationship is alternatively hostile and the use of force is hindered alone by a balance of power11. In comparison, a security community is based on a fundamental, unambiguous and long-term convergence of interests among the actors regarding the avoidance of war12. In this context, ASEAN regionalism is more likely to be conceptualized as the process of make the security community rather than the latter. Although a security community seems to be constructed on the ground of interests and identities rather than the idea of ordinary threat, recen t literature sketched by Adler and Barnett stress that a security community can actually be triggered by common threat such as cataclysmic events13.As Adler puts it, the concept of a community is the idea that actors can share values, norms, and symbols that provide a social identity, and engage in various interactions in myriad spheres that reflect long-term interests, diffuse reciprocity and trust, strikes fear14. Furthermore, Hurrell attempts to suggest a series of approaches to study contemporary regionalism. He notes that cooperative arrangements in regional cooperation could serve a number of purposes on the one hand, they can serve as a means of responding to external challenges and of coordinating regional positionsin international institutions or negotiating forums. On the other, they can be developed to secure welfare gains, to bring forward common values or to solve common problems arising from increased levels of regional interdependence. In the security field, for exam ple, such cooperation can range from the stabilization of a regional balance of power, to the institutionalization of confidence-building measures, to the negotiation of a region-wide security regime.15The concept of security community can be applied to explain the creation and the behaviour of ASEAN. During the time of the Cold War, great power rivalries between the Soviet Union and the US in the region has turned Southeast Asia into a battleground with the regional states world used by the opponents with the attempt to create blocs which support their positions or ideologies in the war. Simultaneously, many states in the region have been oppressed by external powers for centuries and not being treated as a respectable actor in the international agenda. Facing with the same hardship, therefore, they came together and create a region free from external interference. However, with the end of Cold War, the security order in this region is characterized by new factors of conflict and instability and regional policy-makers have expressed misgivings about the strategic uncertainties and conflict-creation potential of a post-Cold War order at the regional level16.Among the regional powers, China, Japan and India are generally being seen as the three leading contenders for influence17. For some, the involvement of US in the region as the balance of power is still desirable and the possibility of its withdrawal remains a major matter to of the regions stability18. In fact, there are a number of unsolved tensions in the region and most of them revolve about Chinas strategic ambitions such as its claims for the Spartly Islands. In responding to the new challenge, the ASEAN states have to reconsider and adjust some of the assumptions and principles underlying ASEAN regionalism in order to contribute to regional security and order embedded in the 1992 Singapore Declaration. In order to examine in what ways the driving forces of regionalism in South-east Asia have chang ed since the end of the Cold War, it is essential to look at some good example studies of ASEANs post-Cold War diplomacyChinas claims for the Spratly Islands and ASEANs response Situated in the South China Sea, the Spratly Islands consists of islets and reefs with suspected deposits of oil and gas19. The struggles involve China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. Many worried that the dispute will turn into a potential source of armed conflict involving ASEAN members particularly because the likelihood of any agreement on the word development of the islands involving all the claimants, as pro constitute by some regional policy-makers and analysts, has limited plausibility20. In behold of this, other ASEAN members initiated efforts to address the security issue which was seen as a destabilizing force in the region in the post-Cold War period. Finally in 1989, it was Indonesia alone launched the South China Sea Workshop (SCSW)21 to promote peaceful settlement of th e dispute by emphasizing the lessons of Cambodian conflict and the lessons from ASEAN regional cooperation. Although the workshop has been extended to include China, Vietnam and Laos in 1991, there were no collective ASEAN position or action on the dispute.The irony lies on the fact that the Spratly seminars are a unilateral Indonesian initiative, resulting from diplomacy not by ASEAN or even a group within ASEAN but by one member country22. The regional community sense was missing in this incident particularly because Malaysia and the Philippines feared that multilateral forum could lessen their negotiating ability thusly making bilateral settlements impossible. As a result, they were not willing to support ASEAN to settle the dispute involving other member states23. This indicates their determination to uphold national autonomy and also their perspective to view ASEAN solo as a confidence-building forum rather than a regional community24. Consequently in 1992, China passed a eq uity on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the Peoples Republic of China. The aim of this command is for China to formalize far-reaching claims in the South China Sea.The assertiveness of China caused doubt over the strong point of the previous launched workshops and made ASEAN members realized that China insisted on unilateral means to solve the problem. ASEAN responded to Chinas claims with the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea issued in the same year. The Declaration emphasized the require to resolve all sovereignty and jurisdictional issues pertaining to the South China Sea by peaceful meanswithout resort to force and it urged all parties to exercise constraint25. It has been pointed out that ASEAN has claimed some success by placing the dispute on the agenda of the ASEAN regional gathering (ARF) with the support of intense lobbying26. At the same time, ASEAN has been criticized for failing to manage codes of consume in that China continued to carry on i ts bilateral agreement with Vietnam in 1993 and Philippines in 199527. However, in a bigger picture, it made clear that all ASEAN members has developed a respect for the codes of conduct enshrined in the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation on issues relating to peaceful settlement of conflicts and the non-use of force.Evolution of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)The ASEAN whirligig of 1992 declared that ASEAN shall seek avenues to engage Member States in new areas of cooperation in security matters, therefore, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established in 1993 which serves as a multilateral consultative forum aimed at promoting preventive diplomacy and confidence building among the states in the Asia-Pacific region28. Through the ARF, ASEAN hoped to create regional order based on its own norms as well as the new norm of inclusiveness which is essential to cooperative security29. In this content, the ARF provided a test of ASEANs norms as the membership of ARF included all the ma jor powers of the international system whereby the regional order in this region would also base on the inclusive approach meaning that the major powers would engage in the management of regional order.In 1995, the Philippines discovered the incident of Mischief Reef by China while ASEAN responded by issuing a joint statement criticizing China30. It seems this stand of ASEAN fulfils the idea of community, however, it is only a partial fulfillment due to the fact that the ASEAN members have different interpretations of the conflict. ASEAN consensus is always revolved around the norms of peaceful settlement of conflict which is being seen as the guarantee for stability.However, they did not identify with the position of the Philippines, for instance, Thailand considered the dispute as bilateral and not a dispute between ASEAN and China. Again, the event actually put a test on the ASEAN members ability to come up with a collective position. As Malik comments on the future of the Southe ast Asia regionalism, he points out that to maintainpeace in the region, it is not only founded on the stability of a balance but is sourced in a sense of shared aspirations and common destiny31. In view of this, the lack of consensus among ASEAN member states indicated their unwillingness to demand standards of behaviour from China which only reinforced the ASEANs partial fulfillment as a community.In general, the post-Cold War period has posed unleashing of conflicts in the Asia Pacific region which were effectively suppressed during the colonial era and the subsequent period of superpower rivalry32. With the end of bipolarity, there is a greater potential of conflict. This paper has examined ASEANs behaviour in security affairs during the post-Cold War ear with the objective of assessing the validity of the idea of community. Many scholars have widely admit ASEANs potential to become a regional security community from both within and removed the region. Snitwongse notes that alt hough ASEAN may not be able to fully achieve self-reliance, its most striking achievement has been community building33.Simon claims that ASEAN is perhaps a security community in which no member would consider the use of force against each other to settle disputes34. In the aftermath of the end of Cold War, the absence of war among the ASEAN members is indeed being recognized by many as a great achievement. Based on the discussion of this paper, it has proved that ASEAN has developed some of the attributes of what Adler and Barnett call it as a nascent security community where a number of triggering mechanisms including threat perceptions, shared identity and organizational emulation are present.After three decades of progress in promoting peaceful intra-regional order, ASEAN faced its greatest challenge since the end of Cold War as the menstruum regional security environment remains in a state of uncertainty. Nonetheless, the prospect of a regional power vacuum implies the possibi lity of ASEANs further progress while the question remains whether ASEAN itself can fill the security gap by mobilizing its collective diplomatic and political resources.BibliographyAcharya, A., A New Regional Order In South-East Asia ASEAN in the Post-ColdWar Era, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 279, London, 1993Acharya, A., Constructing a security Community in Southeast Asia ASEAN and the problem of regional order, London, 2001Adler, E & Barnett, M., A framework for the study of security communities, in Adler, E. & Barnett, M (eds.) 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